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uropean integration - very well, but of what? On the basis of what? We are 
^surely entitled to ask. 
Of course, it could be that we do not need to look too deeply for an answer. In 
Britain, the "European project" has usually been sold (if at times disingenuously) as 
a matter of economic prudence, while for its Franco-German architects it was 
intended, understandably enough, as a means of making unthinkable another major 
European war by locking the economic interests of the main powers together. Add to 
this the external threat posed by the Soviet Union, and it is easy to see why for a long 
time no deep rationale for European integration was really necessary. 
However, the current situation is different. In Britain the belated recognition 
that "Europe" means something more than a common market is causing much soul-
searching and has led to the implosion of one of the major political parties. Else-
where, the very success of the original idea casts doubt on further steps: war between 
France and Germany is unthinkable already, so what are new integrative measures 
such as the introduction of the Euro for? A majority of the population in the 
countries undertaking the venture remains to be convinced of its value. Perhaps most 
significantly, the prospect to the East has changed beyond all recognition. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union not only removed one of the most obvious reasons for 
European integration, it also brought into question once more what should be 
integrated. Instead of the neat boundary line formed by the iron curtain, there is now 
a large space covered with question marks. People are going back to their maps and 
asking again, almost without irony: "what is Europe?" 
I will argue in this paper that any serious answer must include the idea that we 
are sceptics and cynics alongside any more "positive" features, for these are among 
the most characteristic and distinctive European traits. However, this does not mean 
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that I am intent on pouring cold water on all pan-European hopes, or that I want to 
engage in another bout of European self-flagellation of the type that was so popular 
after the catastrophe of world war I. For our scepticism and cynicism constitute an 
ambiguous inheritance, and there is much about it that one can be proud of. There 
are some uncomfortable implications for the "European project" of integration, to be 
sure, but perhaps it is unwise (even un-European?) to associate European identity too 
closely with any project. 
I. Some traditional "ideas of Europe". 
Although the use of the term "Europe" goes back to the Greeks and attempts to 
contrast it with the rival terms "Africa" and "Asia" are almost as ancient, it is only in 
the last two hundred years or so that serious attempts have been made to give it a 
clearly defined meaning.1 Part of the difficulty of this task lies in the fact that, uniquely 
among the world's continents, Europe has no clear physical boundaries, being rather 
a 'protruding little peninsula' of Asia, as Nietzsche once unflatteringly put it.2 In this 
situation, attempts to define Europe have inevitably relied primarily on references to 
alleged shared characteristics or inheritances of its peoples. Some of the most popular 
candidates have been: the freedom and individualism beloved of Greece, the Roman 
legacy of state and law, Christianity, Enlightenment, a shared and distinctive culture, 
a morally and technically advanced civilisation, progress, modernity.3 
I do not wish to dispute the significance of any of these elements in the formation 
of Europe,4 but so far as motifs for the present go they seem to suffer from one or both 
of two objections: that they are not uniquely European, and thus cannot constitute a 
basis for a distinctively European identity; or that they have declined in significance, 
and thus cannot be the basis for a European identity today. So far as the first point is 
concerned, the key problem nowadays is to distinguish what is European from what is 
American, which seems to me more or less automatically to rule out most of the 
proposed candidates from the list. Most of them were after all thought up at a time 
when Europe held a position of political and economic dominance in the world and 
was defining itself proudly in relation to "backward" Asia, and so long as America 
could be seen as a mere colonial or post-colonial imitator the fact that it happened to 
share many "European" values was in no way threatening. Now, however, the situation 
is very different and for Europeans somewhat uncanny: it is America that has usurped 
Europe's place as the dominant political, military and economic force in the world, 
and Europe fears "Americanisation", a reversal of the colonial tide; and yet at the same 
time America is more "European" than Europe itself in terms of many of the values 
that were supposed to constitute European identity - it places more emphasis on the 
individual, it is more freedom-loving, more Christian, more technically advanced, 
more convinced about progress, more modern. It has sometimes been argued that this 
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represents after all a European triumph, since genealogically speaking everything 
American is European at base,5 but for many, perhaps most, Europeans, enough has 
been added to and subtracted from these origins for America to appear as an alien 
Other against which Europe must find some way of differentiating itself. 
This, then, is one reason why many of the traditional ideas of Europe will no longer 
do. Another is that Europe itself has gone through convulsions in the twentieth century 
which have had a shattering effect on some of the core positive conceptions of Europe. 
In the century of total war and programmatic genocide: why not associate Europe with 
destruction rather than progress, with irrationality rather than Enlightenment, with 
barbarism rather than civilisation, with enslavement rather than freedom? A long dark 
shadow now accompanies all attempts to find a distinctly European identity. 
II. Scepticism and cynicism as ideas of Europe. 
Why not look, then, at a darker possibility - namely, that we Europeans are sceptics 
and cynics? Such a hypothesis was first put forward by Spengler in 1918, at a time 
when faith in God, king, country and progress had been dramatically undermined by 
four years of carnage, and the visions of Europe put forward in the years that followed 
were characterised primarily by expressions of pessimism and uncertainty.6 But if 
cynicism and scepticism were prominent in Europe in the years after the first world 
war, it can be questioned whether this constituted a persistent and fundamental 
feature of Europe, or merely a passing reaction to a traumatic event. And even if 
scepticism and cynicism have a deeper basis in the European consciousness, are they 
distinctively European; in particular, are they un-American? 
Scepticism and cynicism both of course have their philosophical roots in Europe, 
in Ancient Greece. Although the original Sceptics and Cynics differed markedly from 
one another, they can be seen as holding in common a rejection of belief in things 
"higher than experience" (and thus as being fundamentally anti-Platonic and against 
that idealism, in both senses of the word, that has dominated Western philosophy 
since Plato). Where they differ is in the grounds and style of that rejection: for the 
Sceptics, an epistemic problem stands in the foreground - that, from the given of 
experience, a multiplicity of explanations and interpretations always seems possible 
and none seems capable of proving its correctness, so that the appropriate course 
seems to them a suspension of all judgement concerning the nature of experience and 
all "truths" that lie beyond the immediacy of experience. The Cynics, on the other 
hand, refuse to believe on moral grounds, rooted in materialism: "higher things" are 
higher swindles, distracting our attention from the underlying materiality and 
animality of human existence. But politically speaking the import is the same: both 
are usually viewed by the authorities as forms of spiritual delinquency, for they are 
underminers of belief, and thus potentially threatening to any social or moral order. 
We Europeans: Sceptics and Cynics 237 
However, while there have always been sceptics and cynics in Europe, it is only 
relatively recently that absence of belief has become a widespread phenomenon. To 
some extent this is a reaction to the already-mentioned violence of the 20th century, 
which directly confronted millions of Europeans with the meaninglessness of many of 
the "higher values" in which they had previously held faith. But if that were all, one 
might expect belief to have returned as the second half of the century witnessed 
relative peace and prosperity. This, however, is not the case. Sloterdijk is, I think, 
quite correct to see 1914 as constituting a fundamental break in European con-
sciousness, 'the turning point in modern cynicism' after which 'the naïveté of 
yesterday will never exist again.'7 The accompanying picture of war volunteers in 
Unter den Linden on August 1st 1914, hats aloft, jubilant, is something that will not 
come again. This sense of impossibility suggests that the shift towards cynicism and 
scepticism has deeper roots; these must also predate the catastrophes themselves, 
since if the will and faith is sufficiently strong, any disaster can be interpreted as 
a "trial of faith": the faith is only swept away if it was already weak and unsteady. And 
indeed, more than thirty years before the outbreak of the first world war, Nietzsche 
was foretelling for Europe a 'long plenitude and sequence of breakdown, destruction, 
ruin, and cataclysm' - due to a collapse of faith in the European God.8 According to 
the Nietzschean story it is the spread of Enlightenment which is the ultimate cause 
of the impending catastrophe, since its scientific insights have come to mean that 
'belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable'.9 If this is true, then the spread 
of cynicism and scepticism is a natural outcome of the triumphs of an earlier epoch 
and not simply the result of an unfortunate series of accidents. 
Today, the process of losing trust and faith can only continue in a socio-
economic system which, rather than seeking to install institutions and individuals 
demanding and requiring unconditional belief, is, in the name of efficiency, system-
atically removing the need to "believe in" anyone or anything. Never mind God, who 
has long been unnecessary: far more immediately doctors, teachers, lawyers, bank 
managers and a host of others are being transformed from authorities in whom people 
trust to functionaries whose relationship with their "customers" is determined by 
nothing more mystical than a fixed-term contract. Scepticism and cynicism thus 
creep forward by default, as people lose the habit of believing. 
Are cynicism and scepticism, though, primarily European characteristics? 
Though evidence for such a claim is no more than anecdotal, there are some inter-
esting pointers in some of the explicit contrasts that have been drawn between 
Europe and America. A hundred years ago Nietzsche was already characterising the 
American as frenetically, and by implication, thoughtlessly active, working to the 
principle: "rather do anything than nothing";10 and in a recent work, Timothy Bewes 
has outlined a similar theme, contrasting American "energy without depth" with 
European "depth without energy".11 The typical refusal by America to indulge in 
metaphysics means a refusal of the possibility of that suspicion on which cynicism and 
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scepticism thrive. And just as Europe's self-inflicted wounds contributed to the 
growth of suspicion, so conversely it is hard to see how scepticism could take hold in 
a country that has received so few shocks to its system, that has had so few reasons 
for suspending belief in its founding articles of faith. As Bewes puts it, 'in America... 
there is no question of freedom, simply because the American Revolution, as opposed 
to the revolutions in Europe, was successful."2 
Another interesting comment comes from Horkheimer and Adorno: 'Here in 
America there is no difference between a man and his economic fate...Everyone is 
worth what he earns and earns what he is worth. He learns what he is through the 
vicissitudes of his economic existence.'13 One can almost see the ironic smile playing 
on the lips of these exiled Europeans: as if human merit could be measured so simply! 
Cynicism does not lie in thinking that money makes the world go round, unless this 
view is accompanied by the sense that it should not: if one believes in money as the 
measure of worth then one remains a believer; only the church has changed. 
One final fascinating contrast can be mentioned, this time from an American in 
Europe: 
Over there you think of nothing but becoming President of the United States some 
day. Potentially every man is Presidential timber. Here it's different. Here every man 
is potentially a zero. If you become something or somebody it is an accident, 
a miracle.'14 
Europeans, it would seem, are not just more sceptical about the world they live in, 
but also about themselves. Their lives are not permeated with the belief that they are 
going to "make it" or "be somebody", they rather tend to the opposite view - at their 
best, though, with a heartfelt "so what?" 
III. Implications of European scepticism and cynicism. 
If Europe, then, is a place of sceptics and cynics, is this something to be overcome or 
to be cherished? Even to pose the question may raise eyebrows, since it is common to 
regard scepticism and cynicism as negative, destructive, life-draining forces. The 
sceptic is, not unnaturally, associated with indecision, inaction, and conservatism 
faute de mieux. His inability to believe in anything will, it is assumed, lead to an 
inability to do anything, and thus he will remain stuck in whatever pattern he 
happens to find himself stuck in. The cynic, on the other hand, is often summarily 
dismissed as someone who "knows the price of everything and the value of nothing", 
as a miserable and embittered soul who pours scorn on everything and everyone 
around him that rises up any higher than his miserable condition. Moreover so far as 
European integration is concerned, it would appear that there could hardly be less 
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helpful "shared characteristics": in Britain, indeed, self-styled "Euro-sceptics" cast 
doubts on any and every step towards greater European unity: they are "sceptical 
Europeans" who are "sceptical of Europe". 
Against this, I would argue that scepticism and cynicism are nothing like the 
quasi-pathological conditions they have often been made out to be: they are rather 
rich and complex phenomena, which have added as much as they have subtracted 
from Europe, and will continue to do so. Thus scepticism, as well as its associations 
with indecision, has also often been considered a noble trait when it describes those 
who are capable of acting without insisting on the unconditional Tightness of what 
they are doing; for Nietzsche this is even one of the markers distinguishing "masters" 
from "slaves".15 The negative view of scepticism is, I suspect, largely predicated on its 
elision with what Nietzsche identified separately as an aspect of nihilism: the latter 
occurs when 
we have sought a "meaning" in all events that is not there: so the seeker eventually 
becomes discouraged. Nihilism.. .is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the 
agony of the "in vain", insecurity...16 
Viewed in this light scepticism does indeed seem to lead to psychological crisis and 
paralysis, and to many the claims of Sextus Empiricus that scepticism leads to ataraxia 
(tranquillity) have seemed incomprehensible. However, Nietzsche goes on to argue 
that despair only arises if we continue to insist that the world must have "meaning" 
in order to be valuable. Once we no longer feel the necessity of those fundamental 
articles of faith which have become unbelievable then scepticism can pass through its 
shattering, nihilistic phase and lead on to a greater enjoyment of the "meaningless" 
phenomena of life. There is perhaps something of a "test of strength" here: the weak-
spirited will be unable to bear the absence of "meaning" and collapse into nihilistic 
despair; the stronger ones will be able to adjust to, perhaps even affirm, a world 
lacking explanation. 
Cynicism, too, is an ambiguous term.17 Sloterdijk identifies a form of cynicism 
which involves an "unhappy consciousness" that fits into a system it does not believe 
in because it sees nothing better in prospect. But he also highlights the Diogenes 
tradition, which has never entirely gone away, of a more joyful refusal to fit 
comfortably into a system one does not believe in. The secret seems to be that 
Diogenes can passionately affirm something else, namely his simple, "animal" life, 
and Sloterdijk sees many of the beatniks, hippies, travellers, and Autonomen of our 
own times as carrying out that same kind of cynical affirmation and challenge. The 
most conspicuous feature of the cynic is his contempt for all striving after "higher 
things", including career success and money, a contempt which arises from an 
exposure to and rejection of civilisation and the founding principles that sustain it. 
Despite his claims to be championing "the natural" Diogenes is unquestionably 
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a product of a ripe civilisation; there is no contradiction in him also being the first 
person recorded as saying "I am a cosmopolitan".18 
What links all these strands together is the lack of belief in higher things and the 
value of striving towards higher things, the sense that one's immediate experience is 
all there is; what separates them is how this feeling affects people - whether they 
carry on striving as before but "without illusions", or are crushed, or reject everything 
and start again, or perhaps simply live ordinarily, but somehow more in the now. It is 
the latter kind of "hopelessness" that Miller celebrates as the counterpoint to those 
who would be President: 
.. .it's just because the chances are all against you, just because there is so little hope, 
that life is sweet over here. Day by day. N o yesterdays and no tomorrows. T h e 
barometer never changes, the flag is always at half mast . . .A world without hope, but 
no despair.19 
What does this mean for Europe? For Europe as a "project" it promises little, but 
perhaps it was to place the cart before the horse to thematise Europe as a "project" 
in the first place. For the essence of the project as such is that 'it is the putting off of 
existence to a later point,'20 precisely what Miller praises the Europeans he comes 
across for refusing to do. A paradoxical conclusion thus arises: insofar as we are united 
as Europeans through being sceptics and cynics, we are unlikely to be impressed by 
political projects to unite Europe. On the other hand we are, to the degree that we 
are these sceptics and cynics, cosmopolitan, not divided from one another by petty 
nationalistic prejudices (which are another kind of faith). And through this shared 
faithlessness and sense for mockery, possibilities for communication are opened up: 
not least, the possibility of shared laughter. 
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